law over English common law, and the unacceptability -after British victory in two world
wars -of what they perceived to be rule from the European continent. The Conservative government's renegotiation objectives, in early 2016, concentrated on economic and financial issues, and the partly-economic partly-emotional issue of free movement of people and the scale of net immigration of other EU countries. Wary of deepening divisions within the Conservative Party about British sovereignty, history and identity, David Cameron did not challenge his domestic audience on these underlying emotional issues, nor did he seek to create symbolic events with leaders of other European states to remind British voters of shared elements in their history. 2 In the Coalition Agreement of 2010 between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives insisted on including a commitment to examine the 'balance of competences' between the UK and the EU, across a wide range of sectors -in the expectation that the evidence submitted by interested parties and experts would provide the basis for the Conservatives' planned renegotiation with the European Commission and other member governments. William Hague as foreign secretary declared at the launch of this exercise that it would be 'the most extensive analysis of the impact of UK membership of the EU ever undertaken. ' 3 Four years later, after several thousand submissions from companies, think tanks, business organizations, the Faculty of Advocates, the Law Society and many others, supplemented by seminars and stakeholder meetings in London and other major cities, the overwhelming response in almost all sectors was that the current balance of competences suited the UK fairly well. Thirty two reports were published, at six-monthly intervals from 2012-2014, on fields that ranged from civil justice to transport regulation and from police cooperation to environmental policy. 4 The response of No. 10 to each group of papers published, after careful review -and sometimes hard negotiations -by Liberal Democrat and Conservative ministers, was to seek to bury them by arranging for their release the day after Parliament rose for the summer, or for Christmas. The accumulated evidence could have been used by Conservative pragmatists to face down their Eurosceptic colleagues; but a Prime Minister who had described Britain's relationship with the rest of Europe as 'transactional' rather than deeply-rooted nevertheless hesitated to use evidence to counter deep Eurosceptic conviction. He had, after all, no alternative narrative of Britain's place in the world to theirs; indeed, he largely shared their narrative. He had publicly declared on more than one occasion that his favourite children's book was Henrietta Marshall's Our Island Story 5 , written at the height of Britain's imperial self-confidence at the beginning of the 20 th century. Furthermore, with so many within his own party and in the right-wing media sharing an 'Anglo-Saxon' narrative of British -or English -history, he hesitated to appeal to a different framework for national interests against their dominant narrative of national identity, that of an exceptional history of free institutions and common law stretching over 1,000 years from King Alfred's Wessex to Westminster today. 6 In the 1960s, during the high period of the Cold War and of the dominance of the study and practice of international relations by assumptions of rational calculations of national interest, a young Marxist called Benedict Anderson, studying the international relations of South-East
Asia in an American university, was so struck by the non-rational elements of those countries' foreign policies that after completing his PhD he wrote a study of nationalism as a force in developing countries: Imagined Communities (1983). His argument was that the spread of printing and of literacy brought with them the idea of communities wider than the local and more inclusive than the aristocratic, so creating national communities built around shared language, history, national myth, and differentiation from non-national outsiders. The argument that follows is that we do best to understand the current traumas of both the European Union and the United Kingdom through a constructivist, cultural lens as much as through the clash of perceived interests -through the construction, and disintegration, of imagined communities.
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The EU as an imagined community What self-interested national politicians, working through short-lived coalition governments, had failed to achieve between the two world wars, enlightened technocrats with a broader and longer-term vision were now beginning to deliver: economic prosperity through freer trade Eastern Europe presented; they feared that a wider Community would also become a weaker Community, as well as one that revolved around Germany. It was the UK government, under
Margaret Thatcher and her successors, which promoted eastern enlargement from within the EU.
The United Kingdom as an imagined community
Britain emerged from the war with a ruined economy but a strong sense of nationhood:
success in terms of national survival, though failure -not fully appreciated after 1945 -in terms of national prosperity. We -all of the 'British race', as it states on one of the postwar memorials in Westminster Abbey -had hung together, and we had saved not only ourselves but also civilization and democracy. Winston Churchill, conscious that those who write history shape history, conjured up through his wartime speeches and, above all, through his
History of the English-speaking Peoples, a heroic narrative in which the Anglo-American alliance had together defended democracy and established a peaceful and well-defended Western world, successfully disguising British dependence on the USA and the progressive dismantling of its empire, which began with the independence of India in 1947. 16 Britain remained a global power, in Churchill's encapsulation, because it retained unique influence in 'three circles' of global politics: the Anglo-American special relationship, the British Commonwealth, and Europe -the first of these bringing us the most advantages, the last carrying the most military and other burdens. The paradox of the UK's move towards the European Community, therefore, was that it came from a sense of British national weakness following the imagined strengths of 1939-45. The 1960s saw the end of empire, cutbacks in defence programmes that had proved far too expensive to sustain, an economy outclassed by the dynamic West Germans, and desperate denial that we had shrunk to become no more than 'a major power of the second rank', as the Duncan Report on Britain's overseas interests (1968) put it. 17 The successive American to reshape the way history was taught in British schools, to return to a more heroic version of 'our national story'. She was defeated only by her discovery that she could not impose a standard curriculum on Scotland as well as on England and Wales, and by the robustness of the working party she set up (and its advisers) in resisting the simple messages that she wanted them to approve. Today, the European project is losing the narrative which had given it credibility.
The transformation of Britain
Britain has been affected as deeply as other European countries by these social and economic changes over the past 25 years. Of all the EU's member states, Britain has been the most open to foreign investment and foreign takeovers, including of large parts of its public infrastructure, and the least protective of its domestic industries. It has also been, until the last few years, the most open to both poor and rich migrants, both from elsewhere within the EU and from third countries and other continents. 27 London has become a global city, with 40% of its population born outside the UK and with many of its most expensive properties owned by rich foreigners, often through offshore companies. The international elites who work in Public confusion over British membership of the EU thus reflects a wider confusion about British -or English -national identity. As a Conservative MP said in a private meeting in 2014, 'Our problem is that we don't know who we are, and we don't know where we want to go.' 33 Arguments over the economic costs and benefits of EU membership shrink when we recognise that the narrative that legitimised the integration of Europe, which never had the credibility within Britain that it had in our continental neighbours, has now weakened throughout the European Union, while the long-established dominant narrative of British nationhood is now confused and contested, and no longer fits the diverse community and globalised economy which our citizens experience. Cameron and George Osborne, anxious not to divide the Conservative Party further, deliberately avoided the language of shared history, security and values. 34 The importance of cooperation in defence, intelligence, counter-terrorism and control of cross-frontier migration was scarcely mentioned during the campaign -leaving difficulties for Theresa May's successor government after the vote to Leave in explaining to its domestic media and public why continued cooperation would remain in the UK's national interest. Making a profoundly political and cultural case for leaving the EU, their leaders nevertheless argued that the response of other EU governments to UK demands would be driven by economic interest rather than by cultural or cultural concerns: that the determination of the German car industry to continue selling cars in the UK, or of Italian wine producers to sell prosecco, would trump wider considerations. Britain, they asserted, valued sovereignty and independence above all else; but continental countries were primarily concerned with commercial interests.
Analysis of voting patterns in the 2016 Referendum have since indicated how much less united the British national community has become over the past half-century. The bettereducated, better-paid, more widely-travelled, voted overwhelmingly to remain in the EU; the marginalised, low-skilled, low-paid, voted to leave. Those optimistic about the future voted to stay; the pessimists, who regretted the pace and direction of social and economic change over recent decades, voted to leave. 35 The concept of the 'Left Behind' now entered the British political discourse: those who had not benefitted from globalization, who felt threatened by immigration, and resented the widening gap between their circumstances and those of the more fortunate and successful.
It has not, however, only been within the UK that many voters have resisted the force of international integration: resistance to foreign ownership, to the disruption of technological change and low-cost competition, and to the incursion of waves of immigrants competing for domestic jobs and disturbing established patterns of domestic society, has grown across western and eastern Europe, and even within the United States. The EU has no persuasive new narrative to legitimise its distant level of governance to the citizens of its 28 member states. British politics, and English, Scots, Irish and Welsh politics, also lack a coherent shared narrative round which to rebuild a broad national consensus. Yet France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Italy are all challenged by similar doubts and popular discontents. Diffuse new threats, the prospect of slow growth at best in an uncertain global economy, the increasing diversity of domestic societies and the contestability of national history for rising generations, all make the construction of legitimising narratives at both national and European levels difficult to achieve.
